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International monetary 
matters that affect our lives 
are explained by Mr. Edward B. 
McEnerney, H&S editorial 
consultant and an analyst of 
international economic affairs. 
It seems that most Americans have 
been taking the international mone-
tary system for granted. We've as-
sumed that it will keep on working 
well—and that in any case it can't have 
much impact on our dollar. 
But events of the past few months, 
stemming chiefly from Britain's de-
valuation of the pound, suggest that 
we had better take a second look at 
these assumptions. 
We realize now that monetary de-
velopments in faraway places could 
ultimately strike at our entire econ-
omy. What happened last November 
made this clear. When Britain de-
valued the pound sterling to solve her 
monetary crisis, she also raised her in-
terest rates to help suppress her ram-
pant inflation. Our interest rates had to 
follow suit, primarily to keep American 
capital from rushing to London. 
Result? Tougher borrowing in the 
U.S., with all the attendant impact on 
our domestic economy. And then came 
President Johnson's dramat ic New 
Year's Day report that our 1967 balance 
of payments deficit would exceed ex-
pectations and would require new con-
trols over foreign investment, lending, 
and travel. 
All of these developments served to 
focus attention on the entire worldwide 
monetary system itself. In particular, 
they threw the spotlight on the interna-
tional role of the dollar, now the world's 
chief reserve currency, and on the glob-
al effects of our balance of payments 
deficits, dollar outflow, and gold drain. 
Americans—businessmen and house-
wives, alike — suddenly realized they 
had been ignoring these questions too 
long. Many a conscientious citizen had 
to admit how little he knew about mon-
etary matters—the role of gold, the 
function of reserve currencies, and so 
on—but at least he now could see their 
vital importance. 
For tuna te ly , concern abou t the 
world's monetary apparatus has been 
shared for some time by statesmen and 
monetary experts. This year will see the 
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beginning of a new global debate on 
what to do about it, and this open air-
ing of many of the complex problems 
involved will be a great help to the 
average person in his attempts to un-
derstand them. 
The debate will turn around a plan 
now being prepared by the Internation-
al Monetary Fund (IMF) which Presi-
dent Johnson has said it is now "vital to 
speed up." This plan seeks to help the 
world absorb future monetary shocks 
by the creation of what are known as 
"Special Drawing Rights" (SDRs) for 
member nations of the Fund. The 
SDRs have been called "a new kind of 
money" and hailed by some as a major 
step forward in world monetary reform. 
On March 31, the IMF, headquar-
tered in Washington, is scheduled to 
have completed work on the plan, 
which was authorized in principle at 
the 1967 annual meeting of the Fund, 
held in Rio de Janeiro. When the com-
pleted plan receives the approval of the 
IMF's Executive Roard, it will be sub-
mitted to each government for ratifica-
tion. In order to take effect, it will have 
to obtain the approval of enough of the 
107 member nations so that the affirma-
tive vote represents at least four-fifths 
of the Fund's total voting power, which 
is allocated among members in propor-
tion to their assigned quotas in the 
Fund. 
The plan is a response to a premise 
accepted by most experts in interna-
tional monetary matters. This premise 
holds that the present world monetary 
system has served remarkably well 
since the end of World War II, when it 
was established, but that without sub-
stantial revision it cannot be expected 
to serve effectively for many more 
years. Some even fear worldwide mone-
tary and economic chaos if changes are 
not made fairly soon. 
What are some of the grounds for 
these fears? Why has the system 
seemed to work well so far? Why might 
it stop doing so? What are some of the 
conflicting interests and forces which 
may affect the shape of any revisions 
made? What are some of the implica-
tions this subject has for American 
business planners ? 
The Present System. Built around the 
central core of the IMF, the present 
gold exchange standard system is based 
on gold and two "international reserve 
currencies"—the dollar and the pound 
sterling. The IMF provides a system for 
multilateral surveillance and coopera-
tion which was designed at the end of 
the war to provide the monetary sta-
bility and liquidity necessary to put 
world trade back on its feet. 
The original IMF plan has been elab-
orated in the intervening years and has 
succeeded in accomplishing its objec-
tives during a period of unparalleled in-
ternational economic expansion, pri-
marily by providing access for IMF 
members to a pool of gold and curren-
cies established according to country 
quotas. Each country pays into the 
Fund one-fourth of its quota in gold 
(and can draw foreign currencies equal 
to its initial gold subscription) and 
three-fourths in its own currency. 
Since each nation is restricted by its 
quota, the system can provide only a 
limited flexibility and does not consti-
tute a charter for economic and finan-
cial profligacy. Roughly speaking, it 
acts as a fairly tight worldwide "credit 
rating" system, a way in which the 
assets and liabilities of a country —its 
present worth and future potential — 
can be measured, in a broad sense, on 
a consistent basis. 
If a country under special circum-
stances falls below what might be 
called the general standards of "credit-
worthiness", it may well be given tem-
porary credit by the Fund, since not to 
do so might result in international fi-
nancial dislocations. But these credits 
are controlled, and it cannot simply rely 
upon the international mechanism to 
rescue it automatically. Its government 
is expected to exercise internal mone-
tary and fiscal discipline in the interests 
of international monetary stability and 
to restore equilibrium in its internation-
al financial position as soon as possible. 
During the years since the end of the 
war, the expansion of world trade has 
been accompanied by a corresponding 
expansion in the need for monetary re-
serves. In the years from 1951 to 1965 
the total monetary reserves of govern-
ments grew by $20 billion, from $50 
billion to $70 billion. During this peri-
od, however, the amount of newly 
mined gold finding its way into mone-
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tary reserves, rather than to industrial 
use or private hoarding, has never been 
adequate to supply the worldwide de-
mand for reserves. New gold supplied 
only 40 per cent of the total increase in 
monetary reserves during this period. 
Despite this fact, the individual na-
tions were able to acquire the reserves 
they needed because of one basic cir-
cumstance: the balance of payments 
deficits of the United States. It was be-
cause of the tremendous outpouring of 
U.S. dollars resulting from U.S. deficits 
that the other nations were able to meet 
their reserve needs either by holding 
their dollars or by converting them into 
gold from the substantial U.S. gold 
stock. 
Many experts feel that, so long as 
the U.S. balance of payments deficits 
continue, there is no immediate need 
for new measures to assure adequate 
monetary reserves for other countries. 
But it has long been clear—and Presi-
dent Johnson has now reaffirmed it— 
that the United States cannot afford to 
permit the persistent "gold drain" to 
continue indefinitely. Apparently there 
is fear in some places that if the im-
balance were prolonged, the U.S. might 
well find itself obliged to abandon its 
now-historic policy of buying and sell-
ing gold at $35 an ounce, regarded by 
many as the "centerpiece of stability" 
in the international payments mecha-
nism. 
Some observers also think that, had 
it not been for the Vietnam war, the 
payments imbalance would probably 
have long since been righted. The ex-
cess of our exports over our imports 
(our "balance of trade") has been con-
sistentiy favorable, so they feel that re-
moval of expenditures for the war 
would produce payments equilibrium 
quickly. In fact, according to the Secre-
tary of the Treasury, equilibrium could 
result "within months," or within a year 
at most, of the war's end. 
To the extent that U.S. equilibrium 
became a reality following a cessation 
of hostilities, the lubricating agent 
which has helped the system to func-
tion satisfactorily would have been di-
minished. To that extent, therefore, 
there would be a clearcut need for some 
new way to supply the reserves needed 
by other countries. 
But the United States could not af-
ford to await an end of the war as a 
means of restoring equilibrium. Hence 
the stern new control measures an-
nounced on New Year's Day. Yet some 
observers feel these controls may still 
need to be joined by other measures 
the U.S. has so far avoided, such as tax 
increases and cuts in government 
spending. 
The world will be anxiously watch-
ing Washington this year to see what 
effect the new controls on overseas in-
vestment, lending and travel may have 
and what other steps may be taken. To 
the extent that the measures succeed in 
restoring equilibrium, the need for new 
reserves will become all the more ap-
parent. 
The Proposed New Plan. The pro-
posed plan for SDRs—Special Drawing 
Rights—thus responds to various threats 
to the present system, including the 
shortage of new gold and the potential 
disappearance of the lubricating dollar 
outflow and related gold drain. 
It seeks to provide a new form of pre-
arranged assistance whereby a nation 
finding itself with a deficit—obliged to 
pay out more abroad than it has taken 
in—can obtain the currencies it needs 
to make its payments. 
It seems misleading to regard the 
SDRs as a "new form of money," as 
some have called them, since the SDRs 
really would be nothing more then en-
tries on a country's "special account" 
with the IMF, as opposed to its "gen-
eral account." The public would never 
deal in SDRs. 
The amount of SDRs credited on a 
country's books would be in proportion 
to the quota for its general account. 
The United States, for example, which 
at present has a quota of about 24 per 
cent, might be issued something like 
$250 million worth of SDRs each year 
for an initial five-year period. A smaller 
country would receive a correspond-
ingly smaller amount. 
Faced with a payments deficit, a 
country would set in motion a kind of 
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bookkeeping transaction with another 
country. Thus, Geimany might be re-
quested to accept a certain amount of 
Brazil's SDRs in return for some hard 
currency needed by Brazil to carry out 
its international transactions. If Ger-
many agreed, a bookkeeping transfer 
of SDRs would be made from Brazil's 
account to Germany's and of the hard 
currency from Germany's account to 
Brazil's. Brazil would then be able to 
meet her obligations in that currency 
but would be obligated to redeem her 
SDRs later. 
For many hard-pressed countries 
faced with chronic deficit problems, 
the plan may well seem a panacea, a 
way of "bailing them out" of their diffi-
culties and permitting them to post-
pone the unpleasant internal measures 
they would eventually have to take in 
order to correct their imbalances. 
This is precisely why the debate 
which has arisen about SDRs focuses 
not so much on their desirability as on 
how to time their ultimate utilization. 
The argument turns around the ques-
tion of when they should actually be 
brought into play and under what cir-
cumstances. 
Basically two camps have formed 
over this issue. One favors implementa-
tion of the drawing rights scheme at 
the earliest possible time, under "lib-
eral" conditions. The other favors post-
ponement of actual implementation un-
til the needs have become fully mani-
fest and then only under the most strin-
gent and carefully controlled conditions. 
In a sense, this polarization reflects 
the fact that, for all the changes the 
world has seen in the last two hundred 
years, the globe can still roughly be 
divided into an "Old World"—basically 
Europe—and the "New Worlds"—the 
new, developing nations, with the 
United States perhaps representing 
"the oldest of the new." 
Thus, the older nations, while they 
favor the economic development of the 
new nations, want to see that devel-
opment as part of a disciplined, "pro-
grammed" evolution into the future, 
checked and balanced in its pace and 
structure by historic economic factors 
and relationships. Broadly speaking, 
France represents the leadership in this 
group, and French thinking has a con-
siderable effect on the thinking of her 
partners in the European Common 
Market on matters of monetary policy. 
These European desires come to the 
fore as the Europeans, led by France, 
insist on a stronger voice in controlling 
decisions over the release of SDRs. 
Specifically, they want to increase the 
percentage of voting power required 
for decisions—from 80 per cent to 85 
per cent. Thus their 17 per cent quota 
would in effect give them a "veto power" 
over decisions which might seem to 
them to be too fast moving, perhaps 
reckless. Under the present require-
ment of 80 per cent approval, only 
the United States, with its 24 per cent 
quota, enjoys such a "veto power." 
This desire arises precisely because 
of the "Old World" fear that the U. S., 
as the leader of the new nations, might 
urge too speedy a course of action, one 
which might satisfy the temporary 
needs and desires of the new nations 
but might lead to what the Europeans 
would regard as "international fiscal 
irresponsibility." 
The Europeans have not confined 
themselves, however, to implying that 
the United States might favor policies 
likely to encourage recklessness on the 
part of others. They have remarked 
that the persisting American payments 
deficits suggest poor fiscal and mone-
tary management on the part of the 
U. S. itself. The implication is quite 
clear: a country that cannot (for what-
ever reasons) maintain its own balance 
cannot be expected to encourage others 
to do so. 
Tropical Agriculture and Capital In-
vestment. This basic conflict of ob-
jectives between the United States and 
Europe comes into sharp focus in con-
nection with the needs and problems 
of the crop-dominated tropical coun-
tries of the world, chiefly those of Latin 
America and Africa. 
It is these countries—the producers 
of coffee, cocoa, bananas and other 
products subject to sharp seasonal fluc-
tuations—that feel most urgently the 
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need for liberalized monetary drawing 
rights. 
When things go well for them, when 
prices are up on the world market and 
they have successful selling years, they 
are likely to have little difficulty with 
their payments. 
But when things go badly, when 
prices are down and their returns are 
low, they feel sharply the need for cur-
rency reserves to keep up imports and 
otherwise maintain their patterns of 
payment. 
If the French-led approach were to 
prevail—implementation of the draw-
ing rights plan on a very conservative, 
tightly-controlled basis—most of these 
countries would not find themselves 
benefited sufficiently by the plan. 
Irrespective of what decisions are 
ultimately made over drawing rights, 
the chief route to payments equilib-
rium for most developing countries 
probably lies in capital investment for 
domestic industrial production of goods 
presently being imported. To the ex-
tent that new productive facilities cut 
down the need for imports, a country's 
payments position—all other things be-
ing equal—is bound to improve. 
Where to get the capital for the new 
flour mills, textile plants and brickyards 
—at reasonable rates of interest—is one 
of the most serious problems these 
countries face. 
If they can find it in the near future, 
their monetary reserve problems could 
become progressively less acute over a 
span of years ahead. If they cannot, 
their problems remain. 
Here, then, is the reason why all of 
the discussions over IMF drawing 
rights sooner or later involve corollary 
discussions over the future of the World 
Bank's "soft-loan" affiliate, the Interna-
tional Development Association. 
The IDA was created precisely to 
provide long-term loans on easy terms 
to foster projects which could enable 
countries to strengthen their economies 
and thus improve their international 
payments positions. 
Unfortunately, the IDA can move 
only as fast and as far as the resources 
it receives from the eighteen industrial-
ized nations which contribute to it will 
permit. 
Anxious to accelerate the pace of 
IDA operations, the United States has 
pressed its associates to increase their 
contributions in the next few years—the 
years in which capital investments de-
signed to reduce imports would have to 
be made if their effect is to be felt in 
time to head off monetary crises for 
many countries. 
Response to the American initiatives 
has been unenthusiastic, with most of 
the eighteen co-sponsors more inter-
ested in encouraging the United States 
to increase its contributions than in aug-
menting their own. 
Thus the future of the IDA's budget 
becomes an additional subject for dis-
cussion in tandem with that of the IMF 
drawing-rights plan. 
As the United States continues to 
press the issue, it will undoubtedly be 
seen that here again a divergence of 
objectives between the "Old World" 
and the "New World" must be recog-
nized. Reduction of imports by many of 
the developing countries in many cases 
will mean a reduction of exports to 
those countries by the European coun-
tries from which they have been buy-
ing. Does Europe look with favor on 
this? Obviously the answer depends on 
specific products and specific countries, 
but it is not too difficult to see that it 
will be unpalatable to many a European 
manufacturer. 
Whither Britain? As this confluence of 
conflicting forces comes to bear on the 
future of the international monetary 
system, it becomes increasingly appar-
ent that the most significant imponder-
able in the complex is the future of 
Britain in the aftermath of devaluation. 
Side by side with the debate over 
monetary reserves and capital devel-
opment runs the dialogue between 
Britain and the European Common 
Market countries over her proposed 
membership. And this dialogue focuses 
ever more sharply on the monetary con-
ditions which the "Six," led by France, 
might impose upon Britain as a condi-
tion of membership. 
In its early phases, this dialogue 
tended to deal with questions either of 
a broad politico-strategic nature or of 
a commercial character. Was Britain 
prepared to "join Europe," as France 
insisted, thus cutting her ties in a stra-
tegic sense with the Commonwealth 
and the North American Colossus? 
Could Britain be a good member of the 
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"European family?" Would Britain fight 
for preferential treatment for Australian 
agricultural products in the Common 
Market area, for example, or would she 
let them go by the board? 
As the discussion progressed, how-
ever, it became more clear in the eyes 
of some Common Market planners, par-
ticularly the French, that British mem-
bership would have to be accompanied 
by sweeping changes in the interna-
tional status of the pound sterling. 
In the world monetary system set up 
after World War II, sterling has clearly 
taken second place to the dollar as an 
international reserve currency. But this 
does not mean to say that its worldwide 
importance has disappeared. The key 
components in world monetary reserves 
remain gold, the dollar and sterling. 
But if Britain joins the Common Mar-
ket, what becomes of sterling? Does it 
continue to play its role as an interna-
tional reserve currency? 
Depending upon the urgency with 
which Britain views her need to join 
the Six, the price may well be not only 
an enforced restoration of Britain's bal-
ance of payments equilibrium but some 
kind of transformation in sterling's pres-
ent role as an international reserve cur-
rency. 
Impact on American Business De-
cisions. American companies attempt-
ing to develop long-range programs will 
find it essential to watch this world-
wide debate over the international 
monetary system, with all its multi-
faceted complexities, during the months 
and years ahead. In one way or another 
the decisions taken will sooner or later 
affect the course of their affairs, whether 
their focus is international or domestic. 
For example, payments deficits and 
domestic inflation may yet drive the 
IT. S. to those classic techniques for 
controlling inflation and deficits which 
it has striven for many years to avoid 
—higher taxes, reduced government 
spending, still higher interest rates, 
and even wage-price controls. 
The ways in which these methods 
might be used could easily spell danger 
to the domestic economy even while 
helping to dampen inflation and stem 
the gold drain. They could lead to stag-
nation of the economy unless the con-
trol throttles were operated with the 
utmost skill. Certainly the implications 
for business planners would be mo-
mentous. 
But the long-range consequence of 
the new direct controls over investment 
abroad could be equally alarming. After 
all, the main impetus behind the rush of 
American corporations into manufac-
turing operations abroad, particularly 
in the Common Market area, has been 
the danger they foresee to their sales 
positions if they fail to get firmly estab-
lished within the emerging tariff world 
of the new Western Europe. Prolonged 
maintenance of direct controls over 
their investments would surely weaken 
long- range plans for compet i t ive 
growth. 
From another point of view, plan-
ners concerned primarily with exports 
from the U.S. to commodity-producing 
countries subject to frequent payments 
crises will be anxious to see the devel-
opment of monetary reserves adequate 
to support a continued rise in inter-
national trade. 
It is quite clear, for all of these rea-
sons and many others, that American 
business planning is affected at numer-
ous points by a host of problems relat-
ing in one way or another to the basic 
issue of international monetary liquid-
ity and stability. 
Few observers, however, would at-
tempt to predict just how much the 
IMF's proposed SDRs would contrib-
ute to solving the international diffi-
culties faced by U.S. business, even 
though the President's desire to speed 
up their preparations has brought them 
new prominence. 
But the present worldwide debate on 
monetary reserves—in which the ques-
tion of SDRs is but a central point 
around which other issues turn—can-
not fail to be salutary for business 
planners to the extent that it brings 
basic questions and opposing view-
points into sharp focus. 
American businessmen—and their ac-
countants—will want to monitor the 
progress of this debate as closely as 
they can. The more they understand 
this complex problem and see its po-
tential effects on their own planning, 
the more likely they are to make sound 
projections and wise decisions. In so 
doing, they may well contribute sub-
stantially to worldwide financial and 
economic stability. • 
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